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Characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia such as thought broadcasting, verbal hallucinations 
and delusions of being controlled suggest a failure in distinguishing between oneself and others. 
In addition, patients frequently experience mentalizing deficits, which could be related to such a 
failure. Here we investigated the tendency to distinguish self and other with a visual 
perspective-taking task that measures to what extent individuals spontaneously take another’s 
perspective when having to process their own (altercentric intrusion) or vice versa (egocentric 
intrusion). This was done in 22 patients with first episode schizophrenia and 23 matched healthy 
controls. We assessed whether patients displayed altered altercentric or egocentric intrusion 
and whether such alterations are related to mentalizing deficits – as measured with the 
Animated Triangles Task (ATT) and The Awareness of Social Inference Task (TASIT) – and/or 
specific psychotic symptoms, suggestive of problems with self-other distinction. The results 
showed that patients display similar egocentric intrusion and increased altercentric intrusion 
compared to controls. Degree of altercentric intrusion was associated with severity of delusions 
and hallucinations that have been tie  to problems with self-other distinction but not with 
unrelated delusions and hallucinations or negative symptom severity. Higher altercentric 
intrusion was also associated with better TASIT performance in both patients and controls; 
suggesting that it may also be beneficial. In conclusion, patients display difficulties inhibiting 
representations of the other when having to process self-relevant information. A failure to 
control or distinguish the two representations could give rise to the experience that others have 
access to and control of your thoughts and actions.  
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Social interactions require one to inhibit or enhance the representation of oneself and others to 
varying degrees. For instance, when taking another’s perspective, during mentalizing or when 
empathizing with others, one needs to inhibit one’s own perspective, mental or affective state and 
enhance the representation of the other’s, while when performing an action or in order to avoid 
imitating others, one needs to inhibit the representation of others1, 2. This ability to control, 
distinguish or switch between the representations of self and other is referred to as self-other 
control or distinction1-3. When this mechanism fails, characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia might 
arise. For instance, echolalia, thought broadcasting, thought insertion or delusions of being 
controlled all seem suggestive of such a failure. At the same time, patients display large mentalizing 
impairments4, 5. A critical aspect of mentalizing is the ability to keep track of one’s own and others’ 
perspectives and to be able to put aside one’s own potentially conflicting perspective when taking 
others’6-8, i.e. self-other distinction. Previous research on visual perspective-taking in schizophrenia 
suggests that they also have difficulties with this specific aspect (e.g., see: 7, 9, 10). However, most of 
the tasks used to investigate visual perspective taking – and mentalizing in general – assess explicit 
processes and therefore draw on general cognitive functions (e.g. executive functions, working 
memory and language)11, 12. Since patients are known to have severe cognitive deficits across several 
domains13, it is difficult to say whether or to what extent the mentalizing deficits are secondary to 
these. In addition, mentalizing tasks typically draw on multiple social-cognitive functions. To avoid 
these issues, and more directly assess core problems with controlling self-other representations, in 
this study we investigate implicit processes. Specifically, we assessed whether patients with 
schizophrenia display altered spontaneous perspective-taking compared to healthy individuals and 
whether such potential alterations are related to higher-order mentalizing deficits or specific 
psychotic symptoms, suggestive of difficulties with self-other distinction. We used a modified 
version of the visual perspective-taking task developed by Samson et al. (2010)6. The task measures 



















judgments about the other’s perspective (egocentric intrusion) and vice versa (altercentric 
intrusion).  
Both abnormal egocentric and altercentric intrusion could potentially affect higher-order 
mentalizing ability. As already mentioned, a failure to inhibit one’s own perspective could interfere 
with one’s ability to take the other’s perspective (increased egocentric intrusion). Interestingly, the 
opposite could also be the case. Specifically, failing to inhibit the other, when taking one’s own 
perspective (increased altercentric intrusion) has been associated with impaired mentalizing. This 
has been shown in the motor domain where an individual’s ability to control imitation – i.e. the 
ability to distinguish between self-generated and other generated movements – is associated with 
better mentalizing performance3, 14-16. Finally, reduced altercentric intrusion could suggest strong 
self-other control processes but it could also reflect a failure to process social information to a 
sufficient degree. Healthy individuals are known to spontaneously take others into account even in 
situations where it is not relevant6, 17 and there is some evidence that patients with schizophrenia 
fail to do so18, 19. Thus, such a failure could impair higher-order mentalizing or at least successful 
social interactions. Of these alterations in egocentric and altercentric intrusion, increased 
altercentric intrusion is perhaps the most likely to cause the aforementioned psychotic symptoms 
that are characteristic of schizophrenia. In particular, the experience that others have access to and 
control of your thoughts and actions could arise when self-other distinction is impaired in situations 
where self-relevant information needs to be processed, e.g. during action preparation. A schematic 
depiction of these relations is presented in Figure 1. Attaining a better understanding of the 
potential role of self-other control processes in higher-order mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia 
and in the clinical manifestation of the disorder could provide valuable information concerning the 






















This study was part of a larger project and results from other paradigms are reported in Bliksted et 
al. (2017, 2019)20, 21. Twenty-three patients with first-episode schizophrenia (FES) and 23 healthy 
controls were included in the study. All patients were recruited from the OPUS Clinic for people with 
schizophrenia at Aarhus University Hospital. The ICD-10 diagnosis of schizophrenia was confirmed by 
experienced psychiatrists using Present State Examination (PSE, ICD-10). Patients between the age of 
18 and 35 years were included in the study if they had received antipsychotic medication for a 
period no longer than 3 months prior to the diagnostic interview (life-time exposure). 
Controls underwent the entire PSE interview with VB. To be included in the study, controls could not 
have a history of mental illness, either themselves or among first-degree relatives. Furthermore, 
both patients and controls were excluded based on the following criteria: a history of neurological 
illness, severe head trauma or current substance- or alcohol abuse/dependency according to ICD-10 
or had an estimated IQ below 70 (based on prior educational achievements). Participants were 
screened for recent drug use using a urine sample (testing for amphetamine, benzodiazepines, 
cannabis, codeine, morphine, cocaine).  
Patients and healthy controls were matched one to one (when possible) based on age, gender, 
educational level (based on the last commenced education), community of residence and parental 
social economic status. One patient was not able to complete the visual perspective-taking task and 
was excluded from all analyses. Analysis was performed on 22 patients and 23 controls. Of these, 
two patients and three controls were not matched one to one. Nine patients did not receive 
antipsychotic medication at the time of testing while 13 had started treatment within the last four 



















the last four weeks prior to testing, three patients within the last three months and one patient 
approximately a year earlier. See Table 1 for further details on the participants. 
 
General Procedure 
In addition to the visual perspective-taking task and mentalizing tasks described below, symptom 
severity was assessed with the Scale for the Assessment of Negative/Positive Symptoms 
(SANS/SAPS)22, 23 by VB on the day of testing. We also estimated intelligence based on four subtests 
from Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third edition (WAIS-III)24: Block design, Vocabulary, Matrix 
Reasoning and Similarities. The study was approved by The Central Denmark Region Committees on 
Biomedical Research Ethics (Ref: M-2009-0035) and reported to the Danish Data Protection Agency. 
The study complied with the Helsinki-II Declaration. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants after the procedure had been explained. 
 
SAPS sub-scores 
To get an indication of the severity of psychotic symptoms related to problems with self-other 
distinction as opposed to severity of psychotic symptoms in general, we created two sub-scores 
based on SAPS, including severity of specific hallucinations and delusions. The first sub-score 
included symptoms that have typically been tied to problems with self-other distinction both 
conceptually and in experimental work. These include verbal or auditory hallucinations in general as 
well as symptoms referred to as self-disturbances that constitute a large part of the first-rank 
symptoms (e.g. delusions of thought interference and being controlled) 25-30. Here, auditory verbal 
hallucinations are assumed to arise from a failure to recognize inner speech as such31, 32. Previous 
factor analytic work on SANS/SAPS item level suggests that the above mentioned delusions load on 



















factor33, 34. In addition, delusions of reference or persecution35-38 have been suggested to be related 
to problems with self-other distinction on conceptual grounds. Specifically, it has been proposed 
that such delusions may be a consequence of misattributing one’s own (negative) thoughts and 
emotions about oneself onto others35, 37. Aforementioned factor analyses also find that delusions of 
reference and persecution load on the same factor33, 34 (although see:39 for a contradicting finding in 
a much smaller sample). Thus, the following symptoms were included in the first sub-score: auditory 
hallucinations, voices commenting, voices conversing, persecutory delusions, ideas and delusions of 
reference, delusions of being controlled, delusions of mind reading, thought broadcasting, thought 
insertion and thought withdrawal.  
The other sub-score included all other hallucinations and delusions assessed in SAPS: somatic or 
tactile hallucinations, olfactory hallucinations, visual hallucinations, delusions of jealousy, delusions 
of sin or guilt, grandiose delusions, religious delusions and somatic delusions. These have, to our 
knowledge, not been associated with self-other distinction in experimental work. Thus, for instance 
a grandiose delusion may or may not be related to problems with self-other distinction, depending 
on the content of the delusion, e.g., believing oneself to be another famous person. This sub-score 
serves as a general indication of the severity of hallucinations and delusions and at the same time is 
less likely linked to difficulties with self-other distinction. 
Visual Perspective-Taking Task 
We used a modified version of the visual perspective-taking task developed by Samson et al. (2010)6. 
Briefly, a human-like avatar was presented on a computer screen (matching the participant’s 
gender), see example in Figure 2. It was facing a left or right wall and 0 to 3 red discs would appear 
on either or both walls. The task had a 2 x 2 factorial design with the factors Perspective (one’s own 
or the avatar’s) and Consistency between the number of discs seen from the two perspectives 



















In the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with a fixation cross for 750ms. 500ms 
later, the word “DIG” (Eng.: YOU) or “HAM/HENDE” (Eng.: HE/SHE) appeared for 750ms, indicating 
which perspective had to be judged. 500ms later, the number 0, 1, 2 or 3 appeared for 750ms, 
specifying how many red discs the participant had to verify were visible from the relevant 
perspective. Then the room with the avatar appeared until the participant pressed one of two keys (J 
for “ja” (Eng.: yes) and N for “nej” (Eng.: no)), indicating whether the number matched the relevant 
perspective. The next trial began automatically after 2000 ms if no response was given.  
The task was programmed in E-prime (2.0 Professional). It consisted of 61 trials in total, including 
nine practice trials. Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized order that was fixed across 
participants so that there were no more than three consecutive trials of the same type. There were 
two versions of this randomization: half of the participants received one version and the other half 
received the other. On 26 of the 52 test trials, participants were asked to verify their own 
perspective and on 26 the avatar’s. On 18 of the 26 trials, the correct answer was “yes” and on 8 it 
was “no” (as in previous work6, the “no” trials were excluded). This resulted in 36 trials, 18 for each 
perspective. On eight of these, the perspectives were consistent and on 10, they were inconsistent. 
It took a maximum of 6 minutes to complete the task.  
The Awareness of Social Inference Test 
We used the Danish version40 of the Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT, Part 2 Social 
Inference (minimal))41 to measure explicit higher-order mentalizing ability. The task consists of 
sincere and sarcastic video clips of everyday-like situations (ten of each). Participants are asked 
questions about the communicative intentions of the people in the clips. We used the total accuracy 





















The Animated Triangles Task 
The Animated Triangles Task42 (ATT) assesses people’s tendencies to spontaneously attribute mental 
states to shapes that are animate12. The video clips are divided into a theory of mind condition and a 
random condition (four in each). After each clip, participants are asked to describe what happened 
in the video. We used the total accuracy, with higher scores indicating better performance. For 
further details, see Supplementary Material. 
 
Data Analysis 
We wanted to assess whether patients display 1) increased egocentric intrusion, 2) reduced 
altercentric intrusion, or 3) increased altercentric intrusion compared to healthy individuals and if so 
whether it is related to task performance on the two me talizing tasks and specific psychotic 
symptoms.   
 
Trials with reaction times (RTs) shorter than 200 ms (0.06 %) and response omissions (patients: 4 %; 
controls: 0.3 %) due to timeout (no response within 2000 ms) were excluded from all analyses. This 
resulted in an average of 35.9 trials for controls and 34.5 trials for patients. In addition, errors 
(patients: 10.1 %; controls: 3.4 %) were excluded from the RT analyses. In order to assess whether 
patients with schizophrenia display altered spontaneous perspective-taking compared to healthy 
controls, we built two Bayesian multilevel regression models. The first modeled Accuracy relying on 
a Bernoulli likelihood function with a logit link. The second modeled RTs of accurate answers relying 
on a shifted lognormal likelihood function. Both models used the full 2 x 2 x 2 experimental design as 
predictors (Perspective, Consistency and Group). We modeled two clusters of additional variation in 
the data (random effects): effects of Perspective and Consistency could vary by participant; and 



















and controls (when possible), by relying on the matched participant id and allowing the effect of 
group to vary by matched id. This corresponds to a maximally conservative random effects 
structure43. Note that the statistical inferences only modeled matches between actually matched 
participants (shared varying intercept with varying effect of group), while unmatched participants 
were modeled with an individual varying intercept and no varying effect of group. We defined 
weakly conservative priors for the models: discounting extreme effects and regularizing individual 
variability (see Supplementary Material).  
From the full models, we then estimated the specific effects to be tested according to our questions.  
For those, we report 95% credible intervals (CIs), evidence ratios and credibility scores. The evidence 
ratio provides the ratio of evidence (that is, posterior samples) in favor of the hypothesized effect 
(e.g., patients display increased egocentric intrusion compared to controls) against the alternative 
(patients display equal or reduced egocentric intrusion). A common interpretation of evidence ratios 
is as follows: 1–3 = anecdotal; 3–10 = substantial; 10–30 = strong44-46. A credibility score indicates the 
percentage of posterior estimates compatible with the hypothesis. 
When the above analyses yielded group differences, they were followed up by analyses in patients 
only, testing whether the degree of e.g. altercentric intrusion was associated with performance on 
the mentalizing tasks and relevant psychotic symptoms. This was done by implementing the 
modeling procedures detailed above on the patient data only, but replacing “Group” variable with 
the relevant predictor variable or variables. Mentalizing abilities were operationalized in terms of 
overall accuracy in the ATT and in TASIT. In the model containing relevant psychotic symptoms, we 
included both the total SANS score, and the sum of scores of unrelated delusions/hallucinations in 
order to control for collider bias47. For complete details on the model implementations and priors, 






















Patients made more errors and had slower RTs on average compared to controls. Patients were 
correct 89% of the trials with an RT of 846 ms, while for controls this was 96% and 789 ms, 
respectively (Accuracy difference on a log-odds scale: β = 1.06, SE = 0.25, 95% CI = 0.65 1.46, ER > 
1000, credibility = 1; RT difference on a log-scale: β = -0.09, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = -0.2 0.01, ER = 14.3, 
credibility = 0.93).  
Consistent trials were answered more correctly and faster (95% correct, mean RT = 776 ms) than 
inconsistent trials (90% correct, mean RT = 848 ms; accuracy difference on a log-odds scale: β = 0.95, 
SE = 0.25, 95% CI = 0.54 1.36, ER > 1000, credibility = 1; RT difference on a log-scale: β = -0.1, SE = 
0.04, 95% CI = -0.17 -0.03, ER = 70.4, credibility = 0.99). 
When participants had to take the other’s perspective, they responded faster and more correctly 
(mean RT = 803 ms, 94% correct) than when taking their own perspective (mean = 827 ms, 91% 
correct; accuracy difference on a log-odds scale: β = 0.37, SE = 0.22, 95% CI = 0.01 0.73, ER = 19.8, 
credibility = 0.95;  RT difference on a log-scale: β = -0.03, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = -0.08 0.01, ER = 9.2, 
credibility = 0.9). 
Perspective-Taking and Schizophrenia 
As expected, when healthy controls had to take the avatar’s perspective, their own perspective 
interfered, i.e. they were slower and made more errors on inconsistent trials (egocentric intrusion - 
Accuracy: β = -0.89, SE = 0.54, 95% CI = -1.81 -0.03, ER = 22.1, credibility = 0.96; RT: β = 0.13, SE = 
0.06, 95% CI = 0.05 0.23, ER = 136.9, credibility = 0.99). However, this was also the case for patients 
and the two groups were not credibly different (difference in egocentric intrusion - Accuracy: β = -
0.16, SE = 0.66, 95% CI = -1.25 0.9, ER = 1.4, credibility = 0.59; RT: β = -0.04, SE = 0.08, 95% CI = -0.17 



















When the controls had to take their own perspective, the avatar’s perspective also interfered with 
task performance (altercentric intrusion). Specifically, controls made more errors when the avatar’s 
perspective was inconsistent with their own (β = -0.35, SE = 0.44, 95% CI = -1.08 0.34, ER = 3.7, 
credibility = 0.79), going from an accuracy of 96% to 94%. However, the RTs were not different in the 
two conditions (β = 0, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = -0.09 0.09, ER = 1.0, credibility = 0.51). Patients on the 
other hand, displayed more altercentric intrusion compared to controls, as reflected in the higher 
number of errors and slower RTs when the two perspectives differed (difference in altercentric 
intrusion - Accuracy: β = 0.79, SE = 0.57, 95% CI = -0.15 1.7, ER = 10.9, credibility = 0.92; RT: β = -0.12, 
SE = 0.08, 95% CI = -0.25 0.01, ER = 14.1, credibility = 0.93), see also Figure 3. In particular, accuracy 
fell from 94% to 82% and RT grew from 814 ms to 901ms. We therefore further tested whether 
altercentric intrusion in patients was related to mentalizing abilities and relevant psychotic 
symptoms. 
Perspective-Taking, Mentalizing and Psychotic Symptoms 
TASIT total score was credibly related to the altercentric intrusion effect for accuracy (β = 4.77, SE = 
2.36, 95% CI = 1.05 8.77, ER = 61.5, credibility = 0.98), but not RT (β = -0.12, SE = 0.34, 95% CI = -0.7 
0.43, ER = 1.8, credibility = 0.64). In particular, altercentric intrusion increased with better TASIT 
performance (Figure 4). This is due to the fact that while the higher the TASIT score, the better the 
performance on both consistent and inconsistent trials, performance on consistent trials increased 
more. Specifically, performance on consistent trials increased from 83% with a TASIT score at chance 
level to 98% with a full score, while performance on inconsistent trials only increased from 80% to 
84%. T SIT is known to be associated with IQ, also in healthy individuals48, 49. We therefore assessed 
whether the general increase in performance in the perspective-taking task and TASIT was best 
explained by domain general processes by adjusting for IQ. We found that the association between 
TASIT and altercentric intrusion remained when adjusting for IQ (β = 3.6, SE = 4.35, 95% CI -3.92 



















76% to 61% accuracy as TASIT scores went from chance level to highest score; while performance on 
inconsistent trials decreased much more: from 75% to 25% accuracy. Thus, while the direction of the 
effects changed, altercentric intrusion still increased with increasing TASIT score. Interestingly, we 
saw exactly the same pattern in controls (TASIT alone: β = 5.93, SE = 9.21, 95% CI -9.26 20.89, ER = 
3.0, credibility 0.75; TASIT adjusting for IQ: β = 13.11, SE = 12.09, 95% CI -6.3 33.26, ER = 6.3, 
credibility 0.86). 
Performance on the Animated Triangles Task (ATT) was not credibly related to the altercentric 
intrusion effect for accuracy (β = 0.46, SE = 1.96, 95% CI = -3.7 2.74, ER = 1.4, credibility = 0.59) nor 
for RT (β = -0.09, SE = 0.24, 95% CI = -0.5 0.31, ER = 0.6, credibility = 0.39). For Accuracy, 
performance on consistent trials increased from 77% with the lowest ATT score to 99% with the 
highest score, while performance on inconsistent trials increased from 60% to 95% (Figure 4). 
Relevant psychotic symptoms were credibly related to the altercentric intrusion effect for accuracy 
(β = -3.23, SE = 1.47, 95% CI = -5.66 -0.84, ER = 71.7, credibility = 0.99), but not for RT (β = 0.05, SE = 
0.26, 95% CI = -0.36 0.48, ER = 0.8, credibility = 0.43). Altercentric intrusion grew with increased 
psychotic symptoms (from a difference in accuracy of 1% with 0 score, to a difference of 39% with 
full score). Interestingly, performance on consistent trials increased from 89% with 0 score to 94% 
with full score, while performance on inconsistent trials decreased from 88% with 0 score to 33% 
with full score. Control predictors, i.e. severity of unrelated psychotic symptoms or negative 
symptoms were not credibly related to altercentric intrusion for accuracy (unrelated psychotic 
symptoms:  = 0.87, SE = 3.76, 95% CI = -5.63 6.36, ER = 0.6, credibility = 0.37; SANS: β = -0.28, SE = 
1.12, 95% CI = -2.1 1.57, ER = 1.5, credibility = 0.6) nor for RT (Unrelated psychotic symptoms: β = -
0.03, SE = 0.24, 95% CI = -0.43 0.36, ER = 0.9, credibility = 0.46; SANS: β = -0.08, SE = 0.2, 95% CI = -
0.42 0.23, ER = 0.5, credibility = 0.34). 
Since both higher TASIT score and higher levels of relevant psychotic symptoms were related to 



















altercentric intrusion. Indeed, there was still an association between altercentric intrusion and both 
TASIT performance (β = 5.80, SE = 2.90, 95% CI = 1.14 10.60, ER = 49.0, credibility = 0.98) and 
relevant psychotic symptoms (β = -4.50, SE = 2.78, 95% CI = -9.09 -0.13, ER = 17.1, credibility = 0.94). 
In particular, adjusting for symptoms, an increase in TASIT score from chance level to highest score 
brings accuracy on consistent trials from 77% to 96%, and on inconsistent trials from 89% to 77%. 
Adjusting for TASIT, and irrelevant symptoms, an increase in relevant psychotic symptoms from 
lowest to highest score brings accuracy in consistent trials from 77% to 80%, and in inconsistent 
trials from 90% to 42%. 
Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate whether spontaneous visual perspective-taking is altered in 
schizophrenia and whether such potential alterations might underlie higher-order mentalizing 
deficits or specific psychotic symptoms that have been related to problems with self-other 
distinction. We found increased altercentric intrusion in patients compared to controls, while 
egocentric intrusion was not credibly different in the two groups. Contrary to this, one previous 
study18 found reduced altercentric intrusion in patients. They did not investigate egocentric 
intrusion. The discrepancy is likely due to the fact that in our study participants were cued to the two 
perspectives during the task, while in the study by Kronbichler et al. (2019)18 participants only had to 
count the number of boxes in the room and were told that the avatar was not relevant. Such cueing 
may draw attention to both perspectives throughout the task even on trials where it is not 
relevant50. The fact that we did not find a credible difference between patients and controls on 
egocentric intrusion is interesting given the large literature on mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia. 
This suggests that a failure to inhibit one’s own perspective when trying to take another’s might not 
be at the root of these deficits.  
We found that increased altercentric intrusion was associated with better higher-order mentalizing 



















other’s perspective even when this is not relevant actually are more able to infer other’s mental 
states. Previous studies have shown that healthy individuals process other’s perspective even when 
it is not relevant6, 17 and this automatic tendency to take others into account is arguably beneficial 
for joint action17, 51 and possibly fundamental for higher-order mentalizing. Thus, although patients 
as a whole display increased altercentric intrusion and impaired higher-order mentalizing, increased 
altercentric intrusion does not seem to impair higher-order mentalizing, rather the opposite seems 
to be the case.   
We did not find a similar association between altercentric intrusion and ATT performance. One 
reason for this may be that TASIT and ATT tap into different processes related to mentalizing, with 
the former being more closely related to perspective-taking. Specifically, ATT does not require an 
understanding of differing perspectives, while this is very much in focus in TASIT. In fact, the two 
protagonists clearly differ in their perspectives during 9 out of 10 sarcastic videos (e.g. one person 
thinks he has worked hard, while the other disagrees), but they agree on 9 out of 10 of the sincere 
videos. Participants are likely using such cues to solve the task. Imaging studies also suggest that 
visual perspective-taking and ATT to a lesser degree recruit overlapping areas compared to tasks 
which focus on differing perspectives, i.e. false belief tasks52. 
We found that increased altercentric intrusion was also associated with higher severity of psychotic 
symptoms related to problems with self-distinction but not with severity of unrelated hallucinations 
and delusions or severity of negative symptoms. Notably, this association seemed to be largely 
independent from the association with TASIT. Interestingly, patients with higher symptom severity 
performed better on consistent trials but worse on inconsistent trials than patients with lower 
symptom severity. A possible explanation for this is that these patients to a larger degree process 
both perspectives concurrently, which will result in better performance on consistent trials – where 
the other’s perspective facilitates performance – while it has detrimental effects on inconsistent 



















consequence of too much weight on or a failure to disengage in processing of other-representations 
when having to process self-relevant information. This could naturally lead to misattribution of one’s 
own thoughts and actions to others and generally blur the distinction between self and other.   
Several lines of experimental work suggest that patients with schizophrenia have difficulties 
distinguishing themselves from others (e.g. when assessing self or other-produced actions, tactile 
sensations, voice recordings)26, 36, 53-55. Typically, these impairments are more severe in patients that 
are experiencing auditory hallucinations53, 54, 56 and/or first-rank symptoms26, 55, 57 compared to 
patients that are not. Different theories have been put forward as to why this might be and how it 
could result in specific psychotic symptoms. For instance, the comparator model58 proposes that the 
ability to attribute events to oneself (or to others) relies on the correct prediction of the kinematic 
and sensory consequences of motor commands. If there is a match, the movement is recognized as 
self-generated, while a failure to predict movement will result in an experience of external cause, i.e. 
of being moved (delusions of control). Relatedly, others have focused on external cues or the 
weighted integration of external and internal cues including prior expectations38.   
Yet, others have focused more on cognitive processes rather than motor processes. For instance, 
Bentall and colleagues37 have, in their attribution-self-representation cycle model, proposed that 
persecutory delusions arise because patients try to avoid activating latent negative beliefs about 
themselves by attributing negative events to others, such external attributions reduce discrepancies 
between actual self-representation and ideals; however, they contribute to building a paranoid 
world view. Impaired mentalizing ability may aggravate this problem by increasing the probability of 
an external personal attribution rather than a situational attribution37.  
Our current results offer a complementary interpretation, where the continuous processing of 
others’ perspective even when it is not relevant may lead to such psychotic symptoms. Whether this 
abnormality arises as a consequence of noisy and therefore unpredictable internal motor signals 



















is particularly severe in patients that have negative self-representation, or whether these are 
independent abnormalities should be further explored in future studies. Future studies with larger 
sample sizes could also assess whether specific psychotic symptoms (e.g. persecutory delusions, 
delusions of being controlled) are differentially related to the continuous processing of others’ 
perspective.  
Another line of research, consistent with our finding, suggests that patients may be overly 
influenced by others. This is reflected in self-reports of heightened personal distress when observing 
others in distress59, but it is also seen on more implicit measures where patients display enhanced 
automatic imitation of another’s actions60 and increased attitude change based on feedback about 
others’ opinion61. Our findings extend these findings by showing that patients have difficulties 
inhibiting other-representations and this is particularly the case for patients that are experiencing a 
higher degree of the aforementioned psychotic symptoms. Importantly, we show this in newly 
diagnosed patients who were either unmedicated or had received antipsychotic medication for less 
than a month prior to testing, thus reducing such potential confounding factors. 
Finally, there is an ongoing debate as to whether this visual-perspective taking task actually 
measures perspective taking or domain general processes such as attentional orienting50, 62-64.  So far 
the literature suggests that participants do compute the perspective of others but only when cued to 
do so50. As participants were cued to the two perspectives in our study, it likely measures some form 
of perspective-taking. However, future studies could include a non-social control task to disentangle 
domain specific from domain general processes. Future studies could also extend the investigation 
of such processes to more ecologically valid social situations65 to see whether the current findings 
that are based on highly artificial stimuli in a constrained experimental context, do indeed hold 
during real social interaction, and thus tap into a meaningful construct. Further, since the current 



















larger sample and it should be investigated whether the findings generalize to more chronic stages 
of the disorder.  
If patients’ difficulties with self-other distinction are indeed a consequence of altered low-level self-
other control processes, then it might be possible to improve self-other distinction by providing 
training for these specific patients. This has been tried in healthy individuals, where short imitation-
inhibition training (compared to imitation training) has been found to improve perspective-taking 
ability66 and to enhance empathic corticospinal responses and self-reported empathy2. The results of 
these studies suggest that it is possible to modulate self-other control processes through imitation-
inhibition training and it would be interesting to see whether this type of training could in fact 
impact the relevant psychotic symptoms. 
In conclusion, we found that patients with schizophrenia, rather than failing to inhibit their own 
perspective, when taking other’s, exhibit difficulties inhibiting the other’s perspective when having 
to take their own (increased altercentric intrusion). Interestingly, the spontaneous readiness to 
process other’s perspective seems to be advantageous in general and is possibly a prerequisite for 
higher-order mentalizing, in particular when it comes to processing whether perspectives differ or 
not. However, the degree of altercentric intrusion was also associated with severity of psychotic 
symptoms that have been tied to problems with self-other distinction. Taken together, the results 
suggest that it is likely a matter of striking the right balance, since a failure to disengage in 
representing others when having to represent self-relevant information could contribute to blurring 
the border between self and others and lead to the experience that others have access to and 
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Figure 1. The hypothesized relationship between self-other control processes, higher order 
mentalizing and psychotic symptoms investigated in this study. Here, self-other control processes 
are probed using the Visual Perspective-Taking Task and measured as altercentric and egocentric 
intrusion. Both altered egocentric and altercentric intrusion could lead to altered higher order 
mentalizing, while increased altercentric intrusion could lead to characteristic psychotic symptoms, 
suggestive of problems with self-other distinction.   
Figure 2. The Visual Perspective-Taking Task. The female version of the avatar is presented here 
facing the left wall. An example of a consistent trial to the left, where both the participant and the 
avatar see two discs. An example of an inconsistent trial to the right, where the participant sees two 
discs, while the avatar only sees one. On each trial, prior to the presentation of the room, the 
participants were presented with information on which perspective they had to take (e.g. “she”) as 
well as the number (e.g. “2”), specifying how many red discs they had to verify were visible from the 
relevant perspective. 
Figure 3. Egocentric (left) and altercentric (right) intrusion in patients and controls. The top panels 
(A-D) present point range visualizations of the models’ estimates in each condition (mean and 95% 
CIs) for both accuracy and RTs. The bottom panels (E-H) present the posterior estimate distributions 
of the egocentric and altercentric effects in patients and controls. Note that for RTs, non-decision 
time, which is equal for the two groups and is estimated as 121.59 ms (95 CIs: 61.90 ms 167.56 ms), 
is not included in the estimates. 
Figure 4. Relations between performance in the perspective taking task (altercentric intrusion) and i) 
TASIT score (left panel); ii) ATT score (middle panel); and iii) relevant psychotic symptoms score 






























Age, mean (95%CI) 23.05 (21.46 ; 24.63) 23.65 (22.10 ; 25.20)  
Females, N (%) 6 (27.3) 7 (30.4)  
Handedness (right : left) 19 : 3 22 : 1  
    
Current occupation, N (%)    
   Unemployed 13 (59.1) 0 (0)  
   Work 0 (0) 8 (34.8)  
   Student 6 (27.3) 15 (65.2)  
   Sick leave 3 (13.6) 0 (0)  
   Pension 0 (0) 0 (0)  
    
SANSa, mean(95%CI) 9.77 (8.19 ; 11.36) 0 (0)  
SAPSb, mean(95%CI) 14.45 (13.11 ; 15.80) 0 (0)  
Related hallucinations and delusionsc 23.4 (6.1 ; 45.9) 0 (0)  
Unrelated hallucinations and delusionsc 13 (2.1 ; 29) 0 (0)  
    
TASIT accuracyd 64.5 (40.2 ; 77.5) 76.2 (70.1 ; 80) >1000, 1 
ATT accuracye 19.8 (12.6 ; 24) 22.3 (18 ; 24) 399, 1 
WAIS-IIIf 91.77 (83.96 ; 99.59) 111.70 (104.05 ; 119.34) >1000, 1 
Years of education, mean (95%CI)   12.14 (11.02 ; 13.25) 15.22 (14.13 ; 16.31) 499, 1 
 
aSANS, Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms. The score is based on the sum of four global scores (excluding Attention); bSAPS, 
Scale for Assessment of Positive Symptoms. The score is based on the sum of four global scores; cThe score is based on the sum of 
individual items. See text for further details; dThe Awareness of Social Inference Test, the maximum score possible is 80 (0-40 for each of 
the two conditions: sincere or simple sarcastic); The Animated Triangles Task, the maximum score possible is 24 (0-12 for each of the two 
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